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Abstract
Emissions trading is fast becoming one of the most
popular policy instruments for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions internationally. This hybrid instru-
ment combines the certainty of mitigation volume
delivered by regulation, whilst also harnessing the
power of the market through an economic approach
to deliver migitation price discovery and least cost
mitigation opportunities. Theoretically, this is a
powerful combination.
However, the realities of uncertainty and lack of
information result in international emissions trading
experience deviating substantially from the instru-
ment’s theoretical potential. This is of particular rel-
evance in a developing country context. Scheme
design is therefore very important to counter these
market failures, and policymakers are required to
strike a balance between this and introducing dis-
tortions. Given that the instrument is in its infancy,
performance of the various schemes up and run-
ning internationally is inconclusive. Emissions trad-
ing proponents argue that the benefits will be
realised over time, once the initial teething prob-
lems are overcome. 
The paper is the result of research conducted in
2008 and presented at the South African Climate
Policy Summit in 2009. It considers theory and
international experience in application to the poten-
tial establishment of an emissions trading scheme in
South Africa. Lack of data, capacity and experience
with markets in the energy sector present complica-
tions in the use of the instrument as a central part of
the nation’s mitigation policy suite, as do market
concentration issues. Should an emissions trading
be proposed, the paper argues for ways in which its
design could address these complications, and align
with the current energy security imperative resulting
from the electricity crisis in the country, the twin
political objectives of poverty reduction and
employment creation of the recently elected gov-
ernment, and the timeframes proposed by the Long
Term Mitigation Scenarios. 
Keywords: emissions trading, emissions trading
scheme, greenhouse gas mitigation, Long-term
Mitigation Scenarios
1. An overview of greenhouse gas emissions
trading
1.1 Emissions trading: defining the
instrument
An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is based on the
allocation of allowances to emit pollutants, which in
the case of climate change are greenhouse gases.
Allowances are allocated to a defined set of emit-
ters, who are required to hold sufficient allowances
to cover their emissions at the end of a compliance
period, or face penalties. Scarcity is created in the
scheme through the allocation of fewer allowances
than emissions, resulting in emitters having to
choose between reducing their emissions in line
with their allowance allocations, or purchasing
additional allowances to cover their excess emis-
sions levels.
The outcome of individual emitters’ choices will
be determined by a number of factors, primarily
that of cost. Where an emitter can mitigate its emis-
sions cost effectively, it is likely to do so to avoid
penalties associated with non-compliance.
However, when it gets very expensive to mitigate a
marginal unit of emissions, the emitter will look to
purchase allowances from other emitters whose mit-
igation profile is more cost-efficient. Figure 1
demonstrates this process within a simplified two
participant scheme. Participant A has a relatively
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high marginal cost of emissions reduction, whilst
Participant B can mitigate emissions at a relatively
low cost. Both reduce emissions internally, but B
reduces below his allowance allocation, and sells
this excess to A. For A it is cheaper to purchase from
B than to continue to reduce emissions in line with
his allowances. For B, it is cheaper to reduce below
his allowance allocation, and then sell emissions at
a profit to A. If the market clears, both participant’s
marginal cost of mitigation is equal, with the partic-
ipant with the lowest mitigation cost receiving the
difference in mitigation costs as revenue. 
Figure 1: Emissions trading in operation 
A market in the scarce emissions allowances is
thus created. In theory, this market enables price
discovery, the identification of least cost emissions
mitigation opportunities, and facilities the least cost
suite of mitigation activities to achieve the target
implied by the allowance allocation. If targets are
progressively tightened, it also encourages dynamic
efficiency, as participants are constantly incentivised
to innovate to find low cost mitigation opportuni-
ties. 
ET is a hybrid policy instrument, comprising
both a regulatory aspect in its quantitative cap on
emissions within the trading system, and an eco-
nomic aspect in its establishment of a market to
deliver mitigation price discovery and least cost mit-
igation opportunities. The regulatory approach
results in certainty of the quantity of emissions
which will be reduced (Hovi, 2006), whilst the eco-
nomic aspect introduces flexibility and mechanisms
to manage pricing and risk. Under a situation of full
information and certainty around emissions levels
and mitigation costs, an ETS would result in the
achievement of a set limit of emissions at least cost.
However, lack of information and uncertainty can
significantly dilute this optimal outcome (Fisher et
al., 1996). 
There are two types of ETS currently defined.
The first is the cap-and-trade scheme described
above, where a cap, or limit, is imposed for a
defined set of emissions. This emissions set can be
defined for a particular country, sector, sectors or
type of greenhouse gas. The cap is then allocated as
allowances amongst emitters, who can mitigate
internally, or trade to hold allowances equal to their
emissions at the end of the period. The second type
of ETS is a baseline-and-credit scheme. Here emit-
ters receive a limit on emissions relative to a partic-
ular baseline, but can sell emissions ‘credits’, gener-
ated by reducing emissions below the specified
limit. Many ETS in existence are hybrids of the two.
A set of emitters operate under a cap-and-trade
scheme, but may purchase credits from baseline-
and-credit participants, to assist them in meeting
their allowance target. The allowances from the
cap-and-trade scheme are set to be equivalent in
emissions reduction value as the credits generated
under the baseline and credit participants. Most
commonly, a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
(tCO2e) is identified as the allowance or credit unit. 
ETSs can be regulated and made mandatory by
the government, or established on a voluntary
basis, with companies and organisations signing up
to receive allocations or targets. One of the main
objectives of voluntary schemes is to prepare par-
ticipants for a mandatory scheme, and to pilot a
scheme to generate data and iron out any design
issues. 
ETSs are the most popular form of greenhouse
gas mitigation policy instruments in effect globally,
with the Kyoto Protocol establishing an ETS utilis-
ing a hybrid of cap-and-trade and baseline-and-
credit (the Clean Development Mechanism and
Joint Implementation) at a global level. However,
ET still suffers from negative perceptions on behalf
of certain stakeholders because of the impression,
particularly with grandfathering methods of
allowance allocation, that the emitter is paid to
reduce emissions, as opposed to being punished for
emitting. 
Theory suggests that market-based approaches
may be more successfully applied in circumstances
where well developed market systems already exist
in the underlying product (for example, energy)
markets. Although, the adoption of a market based
emissions mitigation policy approach may speed
the adoption of the underlying market systems
(Fisher et al., 1996).
Trading schemes have also been used as a poli-
cy instrument to target objectives related to green-
house gas mitigation, in particular those of support-
ing renewable energy and energy efficiency. Where
energy is largely generated from fossil fuel sources,
these schemes will also achieve a degree of green-
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house gas mitigation. Energy schemes can be made
compatible with ET, depending on scheme design. 
An advantage of ET over other economic instru-
ments is the potential it has for enabling sophisti-
cated risk management by participants. This is par-
ticularly true if the scheme allows intertemporal use
of credits (banking and borrowing), to smooth the
emissions mitigation investment cycle. (Fisher et al.,
2006). In theory, ET should stimulate innovation in
emissions mitigation technologies, as the potential
to sell surplus credits provides an incentive for emit-
ters to exceed their targets. 
1.2 ETS as an emissions mitigation policy
instrument: design considerations 
Design of an ETS is critical to its success. ETS
enables the achievement of a specific quantity of
emissions reduction at least cost, in the circum-
stance of full information and certainty (Fisher et al,
1996). However, in the area of greenhouse gas mit-
igation, particularly in a developing country, these
conditions are far from satisfied. The way the
scheme is designed can assist in combating the lack
of information and certainty to some extent. This
section explores the main design considerations for
ETSs, and highlights some of the ways they can be
used to address the disadvantages of the policy
mechanism in the real world.
1.2.1 Point of regulation
An ETS can regulate emissions at three potential
points: upstream suppliers or importers of fossil
fuels or products containing carbon; downstream
emitters of greenhouse gases or the use of products
containing embodied greenhouse gas emissions,
the most significant of which is electricity. An ETS
covering upstream suppliers of energy carriers such
as coal or petroleum will typically target fewer
sources, resulting in scheme simplicity and reduced
administrative costs, but lower liquidity. If the cur-
rency of the scheme is the carbon content of fossil
fuels, this is very advantageous from a monitoring
and enforcement perspective (Fisher et al., 2006).
Unless product price controls are implemented, the
costs of the scheme are likely to be passed down-
stream. 
Coverage of downstream emitters is the most
typical point of regulation in an ETS. This would
include electricity generators and on-site power
generation by industry, as well as emissions of other
greenhouse gases at source (landfill sites, industrial
gas emissions). Direct emissions only would be reg-
ulated (Scope 1 as classified by the Greenhouse
Gas Protocol1) to avoid problems of double count-
ing. Downstream emitters have a greater number of
abatement options available to them compared to
their upstream counterparts, and the coverage of a
higher number of emissions sources introduces liq-
uidity into the scheme, all important for the cost
efficiency performance of ET. 
Product regulation falls into two categories, the
regulation of electricity use, and regulation of the
carbon content of products at their point of manu-
facture. The former is far more feasible from the
perspective of measurement, the latter is significant-
ly more complex. Regulating electricity use does
incentivise both energy efficiency and renewable
energy generation at the point of the consumer, and
captures these substantial sources of greenhouse
gas abatement opportunities. An ETS of this nature
may be restricted to sources of Scope 2 emissions
above a certain size threshold to reduce administra-
tive complexity.
There is some scope for overlap between these
points of regulation, for example, incorporating a
product approach (electricity emissions) and down-
stream approach (direct emissions). Care will need
to be taken when dealing with electricity direct
emissions as well, to avoid double counting. 
Monitoring and administration can be substan-
tial with an ETS, especially in its early year, and
therefore a minimum size threshold for participating
emissions sources is recommended to reduce the
administrative burden on small and medium sized
firms. For this reason, consumer based ETS have
not typically been favoured.
‘Bubbles’ are used to increase flexibility for par-
ticipants. Under bubbles, allocations of allowances
are made to a group of emissions sources, and
these are then divided between them according to
the participant’s unique needs. For example, a
company can receive a target and allowance for its
‘bubble’ of emissions sources rather than each
source receiving an independent target or
allowance. Bubbles allow for entities such as com-
panies or sectors to incorporate their own strategic
considerations in response to the regulation.
However, the operation of bubbles may exacerbate
concerns about market power concentrations
(addressed later in this paper).
Price controls on products (not emissions) can
prevent emitters from passing ETS costs straight
through to consumers, especially in monopoly situ-
ations. This mechanism may be important from a
distributional perspective.
1.2.2 Use of offsets and hybrid scheme designs
Cap-and-trade schemes can be designed to include
credits generated from baseline-and-credit schemes.
These credits are also commonly referred to as ‘off-
sets’, and lower the cost of compliance for partici-
pants as there is a greater supply of credits or
allowances (defined to ensure fungibility) within the
system. Whilst the environmental performance of
the cap-and-trade scheme is lowered through the
use of offsets, there may be important environmen-
tal benefits outside the cap-and-trade remit as other
sectors are incentivised to reduce emissions beyond
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specific standards. The use of offsets also presents a
mechanism for enabling new entrants into the
scheme, and to cater for growth in the sector’s cov-
ered by the cap.
1.2.3 Pilots and the importance of data 
The effectiveness of ETSs to meet environmental
targets cost effectively, and without unduly restrict-
ing growth, lies in the accuracy of the targets and
allocations. Overly rigorous targets may force par-
ticipants to restrict product output or undertake eco-
nomically premature investments which promotes
inefficiency. Targets which are too high would result
in a very low price of allowances in the market, and
little emissions mitigation. The accuracy of the cost
abatement information required to set a cap and
allocate targets amongst participants is therefore
very important to the success of an ETS. Undertak-
ing a pilot, or a voluntary scheme prior to the imple-
mentation of a mandatory scheme may allow the
generation of this information and provide comfort
to both emitters and the regulators that the scheme
prices will be within an acceptable range, and too
that an acceptable amount of emissions mitigation
is achieved. It is noted, however, that pilots are not
guaranteed to reveal this information.
1.2.4 Timeframes
Emission reduction often requires substantial capital
investment in new technologies or processes. A sta-
ble and predictable policy framework over time is
therefore important to create an environment con-
ducive to this investment. For an ETS, certainty of
targets and longevity of the scheme is important to
enable the market to establish itself. Long lead times
for changes in targets or allocation methods are
desirable. The ability to bank or borrow credits
between compliance periods also adds to partici-
pants’ flexibility in meeting their targets. Investment
can be delayed to be aligned to planned plant
upgrades, or until a pending technology reaches the
market. The downside of this is that participants
may put off making difficult investment decisions
until the last minute, increasing the volatility of
prices and potentially causing scheme failure.
Setting targets which are incrementally tightened
according to a pre-set plan will assist in enabling
participants to manage their investment optimally.
1.2.5 Target setting 
The size of the overall ETS cap will determine the
extent of emissions mitigation the scheme will
achieve. The cap can be decreased over time in
order to realise greater emissions reduction,
although mechanisms must be established to
enable this. How this cap is allocated between
scheme participants will in part determine the dis-
tributional aspects of the scheme. There are impor-
tant acceptability implications of the strength of the
cap. A regulator will struggle to achieve acceptance
of a scheme if the cap is likely to harm economic
growth. A gradual phase-in of a cap may be
required in order to secure participant buy-in.
1.2.6 Allocation of allowances and baselines
There are three main methods considered for
allowance allocation in an ETS. The first is termed
‘grandfathering’, and refers to a system where
allowances are allocated without charge according
to actual historical emissions. A base year (or choice
of years) is chosen, and allowances allocated as a
percentage of that year’s emissions. The choice of
year is critical, especially when the base period was
at all unusual, or the industry experiences cyclicali-
ty. The choice of an inappropriate base year has the
potential to prejudice the participant if overly
restrictive, or result in windfall gains if they are allo-
cated allowances in excess of current emissions. 
Grandfathering suffers from the basic defect that
those who polluted most in the past are most
rewarded in the allocation of permits and it is inher-
ently very administratively burdensome, requiring a
high level of data on the part of the regulator. It is
also difficult to make the system flexible to allow for
growth or decay of industries. However, grandfa-
thering may be necessary as a way of achieving the
acceptability of a scheme by industry. Theoretically,
grandfathering should be replaced by an auctioning
system as soon as possible after the ETS has been
introduced. 
The second is allowance auctioning. Here, the
pool of available allowances is auctioned by the
regulator, and emitters bid for the allowances they
believe they will need. Auctioning does not suffer
from the perception of ‘benefiting the emitter’, and
has the added benefit of generating government
revenue. These revenues could be earmarked for a
reduction in other taxes which will benefit business
or society, or revenues could be used to offer incen-
tives to encourage the research into and adoption
of emission-reducing technologies and processes. 
Finally, benchmarking emissions against a sector
best practice, and issuing allowances against this
best practice level is the final allocation method. A
benchmark is established for a sector, and this is
then multiplied by an indicator of the installation’s
level of economic activity (either output or energy
consumption). Benchmarking has the advantage of
rewarding low-emitters, but has disadvantage of
benchmarks being very difficult to establish
(Ellerman and Jaskow, 2008). Benchmarking is also
a free allocation method, and immediately preju-
dices new emissions-inefficient participants with no
mechanism for adjusting over time. 
Under an auctioning allocation mechanism
there is a net transfer of income from polluters to
the regulator. Polluters experience their mitigation
costs in addition to this net transfer. Under bench-
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marking and grandfathering, wealth is generated
within the participants, although they will incur mit-
igation costs to the extent that the cap is stringent. 
An ETS must make provision for new entrants
and closures, in order not to compromise sector or
economic growth opportunities. There are a num-
ber of options for doing this. Allowances can be set
aside from the initial cap to allow for new entrants,
who can be allocated these according to grandfa-
thering or benchmarking. Alternatively new entrants
can be required to bid for allowances under the
auctioning allocation method. Offsets may provide
a specific ‘credit fund’ for new entrants. Issues arise
as to whether companies can stock allowances to
allocate to new company operations. Rules for new
entrants and closures need to be carefully designed
so as to minimise introducing distortions into the
scheme.
Allocation methods can be tweaked to encour-
age or discourage certain emissions sources,
depending on the objectives of the scheme
(Johansson, 2005).
1.2.7 Coverage of greenhouse gases and sources
The more emissions sources included in an ETS,
the greater the potential liquidity in the market, and
therefore the more likely it is that a lower market
price and lower emissions mitigation costs will be
achieved. 
Greater coverage can be achieved by including
a greater number of greenhouse gases (as opposed
to a scheme which just covers carbon dioxide), a
greater number of sectors, or a greater number of
regions or countries. However, greater coverage
comes with its downside of greater administrative
complexity, and the potential that particular long
term ‘infrastructure’ abatement technologies won’t
be installed timeously because other short term
greenhouse gas sources are cheaper to reduce first.
Consideration should be given to the extent of
power concentration which exists in the underlying
product and emissions markets. According to Fisher
et al., (1996: 430): 
In order for a tradable permit system to work
effectively, relatively competitive conditions
must exist in the permit (and product) markets.
The degree of competition will help determine
the amount of trading that occurs and the cost
savings that will be realised. Should any one
firm control a significant share of the total num-
ber of permits, its activities may influence permit
prices.
Therefore, where monopolistic or oligopolistic mar-
ket structures are prevalent, the scheme design will
need to counter potential strategic actions by par-
ticipants. Hovi (2006) finds that ET provides more
opportunities for corruption than an emissions tax.
1.2.8 Penalties, price floors and ceilings
ET establishes a set quantity of emission reductions,
but does not establish the cost of achieving these
reductions. This is identified through the market
mechanism. This leaves significant uncertainty to
emitters, especially when prices are volatile. There
are a number of ways of containing cost uncertain-
ty within an acceptable range to enable investment
decisions to be made. 
Penalties can represent a price, or cost ceiling. If
the penalty for not complying with targets is a set
fine per allowance short, the emitter can calculate
the maximum cost of non-compliance. Direct price
ceilings have the same effect: the market price of an
allowance is prevented from rising above a maxi-
mum amount. Similarly, price floors give partici-
pants certainty that if they reduce emissions below
their compliance amount, they will receive mini-
mum compensation from the market. Both ceilings
and floors are ‘market distortions’ which reduce the
efficiency of the market, but which may be required
for the acceptability of the scheme to participants,
and for smoothing investment.
Outside of the ETS, price controls can be
invoked to protect certain sectors, and reduce the
impact of the scheme. Mechanisms to contain com-
petitiveness impacts include: tariffs on traded
goods, tax rebates for energy intensive industry, or
utilising intensity rather than absolute targets in the
scheme.
1.2.9 Implementation and transaction costs
A number of factors influence the extent of inef-
ficient implementation and transaction costs associ-
ated with emissions trading, and which represent a
deadweight loss to society. Many have been men-
tioned above, and include: power concentration in
the product or emissions markets, and the potential
for strategic manipulation, the pre-existing regulato-
ry environment (the more complex and distorted
this environment, the greater the costs of ET), and
the degree of enforcement required. (Fisher et al.,
2006). 
Transaction costs can be reduced through access
to data, and creating facilities to reduce search costs
for participants wishing to transact during the
scheme. Liquidity also reduces transaction costs.
1.3 International experience with ETS
ET is a relatively new policy mechanism for the
achievement of environmental objectives, devel-
oped to address some of the disadvantages of regu-
lation, taxation and subsidies. ET was first explored
practically through the trading of rights to emit
oxides of sulphur and nitrogen (SOx and NOx) in
North America in the early 1990s. Whilst not green-
house gas schemes, they do provide valuable
examples of relatively long-standing schemes. Since
then, ET has been applied in a number of countries
and regions on both a voluntary and mandatory
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basis over the past five years, most notably in the
European Union which is home to the largest
mandatory ETS currently operational, which can be
described as the hub of the international market for
greenhouse gas emissions credits.
Lessons from international experience are signif-
icantly limited due to the short timeframe during
which the schemes have been operational. Many
have experienced teething problems, and the
demonstrated impact on emissions has been typi-
cally low. Those in favour of ET and market mech-
anisms call for patience to enable the benefits of the
market to establish themselves, but alternatives
such as taxes or regulation are receiving attention
due to the urgency of the climate issue.
1.3.1 SOx and NOx ETS in the US
Designed to supersede regulation, SOx and NOx
emissions from electricity generating facilities and
large industrial boilers across the United States are
covered under mandatory cap-and-trade schemes.
The analysis in this section is drawn from the largest
implementation of the SOx and NOx schemes, the
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM)
on the California South Coast, which claims to have
the longest history and implementation experience
(EPF, 2002).
The initial cap the RECLAIM scheme was set too
high, with 40-60 percent excess allowances in the
system initially (EPF, 2002). The first seven years of
the scheme were therefore characterised by low
prices, and little investment in pollution control
interventions. However, this changed with an
increase in energy demand, causing scarcity of
allowances and a corresponding increase in prices.
Some believe that industry was lulled into a false
sense of security due to the low prices, and failed to
plan for future scarcity. Stakeholders to the scheme
believe however that the scheme has resulted in
lower compliance costs, and has enabled industry
to plan switches to a more efficient plant more cost
effectively.
Although there is no definitive result on per-
formance of the RECLAIM ETS when compared to
a hypothetical regulatory alternative, the EPA
analysis suggests that RECLAIM has not performed
well in terms of emissions reduction over the eight
plus years covered by the analysis. However, other
sources indicate that, on a national scale, the SOx
and NOx schemes have ‘unquestionably and sub-
stantially reduced the costs of complying with the
Clean Air Act’ (Tietenberg as cited in Common et
al., 1999).
Another, less positive, finding from a review of
the RECLAIM scheme indicates that the potential to
earn revenues from the sale of excess credits neither
motivated investment in an emissions reduction
plant, nor fostered innovation. 
1.3.2 The EU Emissions Trading System 
The European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS) is currently the largest cap-and-trade sys-
tem in the world, generating 80 percent of the glob-
al turnover of allowances and credits (European
Commission, 2007). The scheme covers thousands
of emissions sources in energy generation and spe-
cific energy-intensive industrial sectors including
combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron
and steel plants and factories making cement, glass,
lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper (European
Commission, 2007). A size threshold on emitting
sources is in place to control transaction costs for
smaller entities. Discussions are underway around
including the aviation industry from 2011 onwards.
Only direct (Scope 1) greenhouse gas emissions are
covered, with one European Allowance Unit (EUA)
representing the right to emit one tCO2e. Offsets are
allowed into the scheme subject to percentage limi-
tations, in the form of credits from the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The first phase of the scheme, Phase 1 (2005 –
2007) was largely a trial, and included only carbon
dioxide emissions. Phase 2 (2008 – 2012) is cur-
rently in place and sees the addition of nitrous oxide
emissions to the scheme (European Commission,
2007). A Phase 3 is committed for 2013 – 2020.
The cap is allocated amongst member states,
who in turn allocate allowances according to their
National Allocation Plan, with consideration for
their particular economic and political circum-
stances. In Phase I allowances were allocated to
installations free of charge to introduce companies
to ET in a gradual way, particularly as the EU was
the only region implementing such a system at the
time (Point Carbon, 2008). Subsequently there has
been a move away from free allocations to auction-
ing, particularly to prevent windfall gains in the
power generating sector (Ellerman and Jaskow,
2008), which has been passing costs downstream,
as can be expected in a competitive market (Grubb,
2006). In Phase 1, 95 percent of allowances were
allowed to be given to installation for free, in Phase
2 this has been lowered to 90 percent of
allowances. In Phase 3 this will drop to 40 percent
for the non-power sector and total auctioning of
allowances for the power sector. Free allocation will
be completely phased out by 2020 save for certain
energy-intensive sectors which will continue to get
allowances free if they are significantly at risk of
greenhouse gas leakage through moving to coun-
tries with less stringent climate change laws
(European Commission, 2008). Auctioning has
been opposed by industry, but strongly supported
by governments, market intermediaries and NGOs.
Findings from Phase 1 have advocated the setting
of a central cap and a move away from national
allocation plans which the EU ETS is hoping to
implement in Phase 3 (Runge-Metzger, 2008).
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Allowances are distributed either through grand-
fathering or benchmarking procedures. Grandfath-
ering has been the most common method of allo-
cation in Phase I and is still used widely in Phase 2
although more countries are starting to use bench-
marking practices, particularly in the power sector
(Point Carbon, 2008). The majority of companies
prefer the use of three of more benchmarks, so that
adjustments can be made for specific situations.
Research into the impact of benchmarking as
opposed to grandfathering indicates that the two
methods can have a significant impact on export
exposed industries. For example, the cement indus-
try in the EU is projected to achieve greater mitiga-
tion under grandfathering, and an increase in prof-
its, but at the cost of relocation of plant outside the
cap-and-trade area (emissions leakage). Bench-
marking achieves lower mitigation, but without
leakage and loss of productive capacity (Grubb,
2006)
Compliance to the scheme is promoted through
financial penalties (€40/t during Phase 1 increasing
to €100/t during Phase 2), and a ‘name and shame’
of non-compliant members. 
Concerns over tight scheduling in getting the EU
ETS up and running have been raised, and this has
been echoed in the preparation for schemes else-
where, such as the proposed National Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia.
Interaction between Government bodies and com-
panies during preparation of the First Phase
National Allocation Plans was seen to be largely
unsatisfactory, and the EC has admitted that any
future significant changes will require adequate lead
time to prepare for implementation and improved
interaction between the stakeholders (EC, 2005).
The majority of companies have indicated a prefer-
ence for allocation periods of ten years plus, with
national allocation targets announced two to three
years prior to the allocation period in order to pro-
vide longer term clarity and stability (EC, 2005).
Uncertainty over long-term developments of funda-
mental rules, particularly allocation procedures, was
found to negatively affect the market (EC, 2005)
Phase 1 of the EU ETS has highlighted the ben-
efits of a short pilot phase (Runge-Metzger, 2008).
This finding has been taken on board by the
Japanese in the use of both the JVETS and the vol-
untary period which will pre-date the commence-
ment of the new proposed mandatory scheme. 
As with the SOx and NOx schemes, the EU ETS
suffered from an over allocation in the first phase,
with allowances actually exceeding installation
emissions. This resulted in a price crash once the
first set of compliance data was released onto the
market (Runge-Metzger, 2008). This over-allocation
has been blamed on a lack of accurate data in
advance of target setting (Ellerman and Jaskow,
2008). 
Banking has been introduced between scheme
phases, after there was a sharp decline in the prices
of Phase 1 and Phase 2 EUAs without banking.
However, this is not extended to inter-phase bor-
rowing (Ellerman and Jaskow, 2008). 
The management of information was critical to
the scheme’s performance. The sudden and uncon-
trolled release of emissions data onto the market
caused the Phase 1 price crash, and overall it was
found that the market benefited by frequent infor-
mation releases on emissions and allowance utilisa-
tion (Ellerman and Jaskow, 2008). 
Returning to the issue of pass through of scheme
costs downstream by the power generating sector,
this was constrained to a degree in countries with
less liberalised electricity sectors through regulation
or the threat of regulation. However, this is likely to
undermine the potential of an ETS to internalise
emissions pricing (Grubb, 2006). Export exposed
sectors such as cement and aluminium have been
found to be at risk of damage to their competitive-
ness as a result of the EU ETS, should prices rise or
their allocations decrease (Grubb, 2006). The prices
witnessed before the impact of the global credit
crunch result in serious competitiveness concerns
which threaten the sustainability of the EU ETS
(Grubb, 2006).
Proponents of the EU ETS maintain that the
scheme has resulted in an improvement in produc-
tion process (EC,2007), and that the scheme should
allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto Protocol targets at
a cost of less than 0.1% of its GDP (EC, 2007). The
European Environmental Agency (EUA, 2007)
reported a 5% abatement of emissions in the First
Phase of the scheme. 
The scheme has resulted in the emergence of a
new business sector involving market players and
financial products (EC, 2007). 
1.3.3 The United Kingdom Emissions Trading
Scheme
The UK ETS was a voluntary cap and trade ET sys-
tem operational between 2002 and 2006, which
aimed to build capacity in greenhouse gas trading
and also to work towards meeting the UK’s Kyoto
Protocol targets. It was the first cross-industry green-
house gas ETS to be implemented. The scheme
covered all six Kyoto greenhouse gases and includ-
ed a combination of direct (non power generation)
and indirect emissions. The 31 direct participants
ranged widely in both size and sector from BP, to
supermarkets to the London Natural History
Museum. A three year baseline (1998-2000) was
used, and an inverse auction conducted where par-
ticipants bid in emission reduction targets in order
to secure a proportion of a GBP215 million incen-
tive pot made available by government. 
The UK ETS was linked to companies who were
participating in the voluntary Climate Change
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Agreements (administered on a sectoral basis, com-
panies received a rebate on their Climate Change
Levy by complying with agreed targets). The so-
called ‘Agreement Participants’ could use the UK
ETS as a trading vehicle to either meet their targets
or sell over-achievement. Finally, the scheme made
provision for ‘Trading Participants’, who were
organisations or individuals under no emission
reduction obligation that entered the market on a
speculative basis. 
The UK ETS assisted participants with the disci-
pline of monitoring, reporting and verifying green-
house gas emissions to the standard necessary for
ET, whilst government gained experience in the
administration of trading which was subsequently
used in designing the EU ETS (DEFRA, 2006). The
voluntary nature of the scheme was identified as
being important for a pilot, although the ease with
which some participants met their targets raised
concern. However, emissions reductions achieved
through the scheme surpassed expectations
(DEFRA, 2006), with substantial over-compliance
being achieved by some participants in the cap-
and-trade section of the scheme (Smith et al.,
2007). As the UK ETS represented a subsidy to pol-
luters to reduce emissions, and was voluntary, it can
be argued that participants self-selected on their
ability to reduce emissions cost effectively, greatly
increasing the cost of the scheme to the government
(Smith et al., 2007). Over 50 percent of the sales of
emissions were from three large net sellers (direct
participants), and Smith et al. (2007) conclude that
market concentration and power issues are impor-
tant when considering the design of ETS. 
1.3.4 The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Scheme
The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Scheme (GGAS), hereafter also referred to as the
New South Wales Scheme is an Australian regional
baseline and credit scheme which commenced in
2003, built on an existing emissions benchmarking
programme which was linked with retailer licensing
conditions, and is designed to remain in operation
until 2012, with commitments by the NSW
Governor to extend targets to 2020. 
The scheme is complex in design, involving both
mandatory and voluntary participants, and is
essentially a baseline-and-credit scheme. Manda-
tory targets are applied to electricity retail suppliers,
electricity customers purchasing directly from the
National Electricity Market and certain scheduled
generators. Certain large electricity customers of
significant state developments can voluntarily elect
to participate. Accredited abatement certificate
providers undertaking mitigation activities in bio-
logical sequestration, electricity or the reduction of
direct non-electricity emissions can participate in
the baseline-and-credit component of the scheme,
selling credits to those with targets. Emissions under
this scheme are both direct emissions and indirect
Scope 2 emissions. 
The scheme cap is based on a limit to per capi-
ta emissions from electricity. This cap is progres-
sively decreased from 8.65t/capita in 2003 to 7.27
t/capita in 2007 (a 5 percent decrease), where it is
maintained until 2021. Emissions allowances are
allocated in proportion to the share of electricity
sold or purchased within New South Wales. For
example, if a retailer sells 5 percent of the total elec-
tricity sales in New South Wales they are obligated
to meet 5 percent of the NSW electricity bench-
mark. The target for NSW as a whole is therefore a
5 percent reduction of emissions below 1989 / 1990
levels by 2012. Accreditation of offset certificates,
compliance, regulatory and registry functions are
performed by the Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART).
Participants are able to meet emissions
allowance targets through the purchase of Tradable
Abatement Certificates (NGACs). NGACs are gen-
erated by carbon sequestration, demand-side
abatement and energy efficiency offset activities
implemented by accredited abatement certificate
providers. Some large electricity consumer partici-
pants are eligible to claim credits for the reduction
of greenhouse gases from industrial processes at
sites which they own and control.
Participants can also claim credits for the surren-
der of Renewable Energy Certificates generated
under the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target,
itself a baseline-and-credit scheme (MacGill et al.,
2003). This is a national target imposed on electric-
ity retailers, who are obligated to purchase a per-
centage of renewable energy. 
Financial penalties of $AUS12/tonne of emis-
sions over target are implemented, with some lee-
way to make up shortfalls between years.
Certificates are bankable with no expiry date.
Amendments to the Electricity Supply Act of 1995
and the Electricity Supply (General) Regulation
2002 provide legal means of enforcement.
The mitigation projects within the GGAS gener-
ated over 100 million certificates in 2005 (New
South Wales Government, 2006). By the end of
2007 there were 204 accredited abatement activi-
ties registered, and the supply of abatement certifi-
cates as of mid 2008 showed a steady increase
(GGAS, 2008). The majority of these certificates
(20 percent in 2005) have come from the electricity
generation sector (GGAS, 2008).
The assurance of continuation of the scheme
independent of the development of a trading
scheme at a national level has provided certainty to
participants and the market, although the proposals
for a national scheme is still proving disruptive.
Major amendments to the scheme will be avoided
so as not to cause confusion given the establish-
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ment of a National Emissions Trading Scheme
(New South Wales Government, 2006). Comment-
ators cite the schemes complexity, issues around
baselines and fungibility of the very different types
of mitigation activities as presenting potential prob-
lems to the scheme’s performance (MacGill et al.,
2003).
1.3.5 The Chicago Climate Exchange 
The main cap and trade system in the USA, a coun-
try that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, is cur-
rently the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a
regional voluntary scheme which commenced in
2003 and will continue through to 2010. All six
greenhouse gases are covered by the scheme and
multiple sectors and organisation types are involved
including the private sector, NGOs and public sec-
tor. Members make a voluntary commitment which
is contractually enforceable, to meet annual green-
house gas reduction targets. The scheme is cap-
and-trade in design, but offsets can be used to assist
in meeting targets.
Allowances are termed CCX Carbon Financial
Instruments (CFIs), and are transacted in contracts,
each CFI contract equalling 100 metric tonnes of
CO2e. All the organisation’s direct emissions must
be included in an annual disclosure which is verified
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA). Indirect emissions are not mandated to be
included in the annual disclosure but may be vol-
untarily reported. CFIs are issued according to an
emissions baseline calculated from an average of
annual emissions from the years 1998 – 2001.
Members commit to reduce emissions by 4 percent
by 2006 and 6 percent by 2010.
1.3.6 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The first mandatory greenhouse gas ETS in the
USA – the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) is due to launch in January 2009 with ten
North Eastern and Mid-Atlantic member states par-
ticipating. Direct CO2 emissions from power plants
will be covered, targeting fossil-fuel fired units of
25MW or greater which burn more than 50 percent
fossil fuel. Each state will govern its own pro-
gramme according to a RGGI model rule, with pro-
grammes linked through a CO2 allowance reciproc-
ity which will enable power plants to use CO2
allowances issued by any of the participating states
to achieve compliance.
The emissions cap for the scheme is set at 120
million tonnes CO2 which approximates current lev-
els. This cap will remain in place for the period
2009 to 2015. After 2015 a decline of 10 percent
must occur by 2019. Each state will get an alloca-
tion from the total cap and can then allocate 75 per-
cent of these according to its own rules, the remain-
ing 25 percent of allowances must be auctioned
with proceeds used for public benefit purposes. In
practice the majority of allowances are to be allo-
cated through quarterly auctions. The first auction
of credits was held in September 2008, with the
allowance price clearing at $3.07.
The use of offset credits is permissible within the
RGGI, but will be limited to only 3 percent of the
allowances held for compliance and eligible only if
the projects are implemented within the US. The
scheme deals with price uncertainty through two
mechanisms. Firstly, should the allowance price
within the system increase to above $7, the per-
centage of allowances and region of offset projects
eligible will change. Secondly, should prices rise to
above $10 the compliance period will be extended
by one year (up to a maximum of four).
2. Emerging lessons from theory and
practice
ET is theoretically more efficient than regulation,
and has the significant advantage over other eco-
nomic instruments (taxes and subsidies) of enabling
government to specify a quantitative volume of
emissions reductions. In the absence of non-compli-
ance, and bearing in mind the potential for non-
additional reductions due to complexities in base-
line setting, this should result in a guaranteed vol-
ume of emission reductions. However, there is a
strong argument in the literature that ET is less effi-
cient than taxes in the reality of high levels of uncer-
tainty and incomplete information (Weitzman as
cited in Fisher, 1996; Pizer as cited in Hovi, 2006).
Practical experience seems to suggest that the per-
formance of ET schemes is disappointing in reality
(EPA, 2002; Runge-Metzger, 2008; MacGill et al.,
2003), although proponents of ET would argue that
this is due to teething problems, and the short time-
frames over which these schemes are being
assessed.
The analysis in section one above enables us to
summarise some key lessons which have emerged
from international experience and theory around
scheme design and the implementation process.
• Setting targets too low affects the credit market
price, inhibits mitigation investment, and
reduces confidence in the scheme (RECLAIM
SOx and NOx, EU ETS, UK ETS).
• A substantial amount of data is required to plan
and implement a scheme, and also to maintain
the scheme (EU ETS, GGAS). Market and eco-
nomic information is key to encourage long
range planning and decision making, and good
communication of this information is important
(RECLAIM, 2002; UK ETS)
• Voluntary market creation mechanisms present
an alternative to mandatory schemes, and have
been used effectively to pilot mandatory
schemes (UK ETS, CCX, Japanese ETS).
Voluntary schemes reduce administrative com-
plexity, since only firms that are likely to have
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large enough emissions (or use of inputs direct-
ly related to emissions) will sign up. Voluntary
schemes are useful for the generation of data.
The effectiveness of voluntary schemes in effect-
ing emission reductions is lower than mandato-
ry schemes. 
• Information asymmetry between industry and
government around mitigation opportunities
presents a serious barrier to the efficient design
of ETS. Negotiations on baselines and target
allocations have little chance of resulting in sig-
nificant additional mitigation action if govern-
ment does not have similar information to that
of industry about the regulated facilities and fac-
tors impacting on their decision making
(RECLAIM, UK ETS: Smith et al., 2007).
Auctioning is one mechanism to hedge against
this information bias (Grubb, 2006).
• Because of the difficulty of setting targets and
baselines correctly, the scheme must allow for
retrospective adjustment should errors be made
(UK ETS, EU ETS), and mechanisms for quick
response to unforeseen events effecting the mar-
ket (RECLAIM). This may be more difficult
under an ETS than for other greenhouse gas
mitigation policy instruments given the impor-
tance of stability for the establishment and oper-
ation of the market (Smith et al., 2007).
• This observation extends to the concentration of
market power within both product and emission
markets. Should this concentration be limited to
a few key players, their influence in shaping a
preferential scheme design at the expense of
environmental benefits may be substantial
(Smith et al., 2007).
• Policy stability and certainty is critical to the
effective functioning of an ETS scheme, given a
market’s reliance on longevity and transparency
of targets to price correctly. Any changes in the
scheme should be incremental and market as
opposed to policy based. Good communication
of changes between players is essential (GGAS,
RECLAIM SOx and NOx). Most schemes under-
taken to date have suffered from policy uncer-
tainty as the international policy environment
remains in flux, and necessarily informs domes-
tic initiatives.
• A balance need to be sought between compre-
hensiveness of coverage of a scheme, and the
inefficiency of including very small players
where transaction costs will outweigh the bene-
fits of their participation. Smaller sources of
emissions have different needs to those of larger
facilities (EU ETS and RECLAIM).
• Grubb (2006) highlights the balance between an
instrument which pursues the objective of influ-
encing long term investment objectives, yet has
to manage short term cycles. He concludes that
institutional independence, and institutions hav-
ing one primary objective (delivering emission
reductions with minimal distortion whilst com-
pensating existing installations for distributional
impacts), is vital to achieving this.
• Market-based programmes require significant
planning, preparation and management both
prior to and during the running of the scheme.
Stakeholder consultation is very important to
develop confidence in the scheme, and min-
imise the potential for costly errors. Periodic
monitoring and revisiting of scheme assump-
tions is important. (Reclaim 2002; proposed
National Australian Trading Scheme).
• Mechanisms such as banking, borrowing, price
ceilings or floors and new entrant allocations
may be important from an emitter’s investment
flexibility and efficiency, but do introduce distor-
tions into the market itself.
• The methods chosen for baseline setting and
allowance allocation are very important for dis-
tributional considerations, and to prevent over-
or under-allocation which would have environ-
mental or competitiveness and economic
growth implications respectively.
• Auctioning enables equivalence between taxes
and ETS from a fiscal revenue perspective.
Auction proceeds can be used to protect export-
oriented industries for which the adjustment to
emissions pricing will be particularly costly, or to
reduce the overall tax burden on companies.
Whilst economic theory generally disfavours
earmarking, this may be necessary to achieve
industry buy-in of an auctioning allocation
method (Muller, 2008).
3. Application to South Africa
3.1 South Africa’s greenhouse gas profile
and LTMS target
South Africa’s emissions are dominated by energy
(around 80 percent) (RSA 2004; Van der Merwe &
Scholes 1998), predominantly from electricity gen-
eration, transport and direct energy emissions from
industry. The remaining emissions are from indus-
trial processes, methane from waste management
and agriculture. From a greenhouse gas perspec-
tive, carbon dioxide prevails. Apart from electricity
emissions, CO2 emissions are found in the transport
sector and from direct emissions in industry (lime
production, carbide production, limestone produc-
tion, on-site energy generation and synfuel’s con-
centrated CO2). A limited amount of methane is
found in the agricultural and waste sectors, arising
from the management of manure and enteric fer-
mentation. Coal mine methane forms a sizeable
component of industry’s non-CO2 emissions, with a
small amount of synfuel methane. N2O from nitric
acid makes up the remainder. South Africa has no
significant sources of fluorinated gases (HFC, PCF
and SF6).
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From an institutional perspective, just under
three quarters of the total emissions are attributable
to liquid fuel manufacturing (Sasol, 19%) and the
country’s electricity supply (Eskom, 53%) (SBT,
2007). An important emissions growth sector is that
of transport. Institutionally, transport presents a sig-
nificant challenge from a mitigation perspective.
The South African cabinet has endorsed a 40
percent reduction from 2003 emissions levels by
2050 (van Schalkwyk, 2008). Due to economic
growth assumptions over this timeframe, this
implies an emissions peak in 2020/25, a plateau
until 2030, and then a decline. The Long Term
Mitigation Scenario planning study models a port-
folio of mitigation technologies to get the country
there. These include a set of negative cost options
(with energy efficiency in various sectors dominat-
ing, with some renewable, notably solar water
heater subsidies), and then those involving positive
cost options (predominately renewables, nuclear,
carbon capture and storage in electricity generation
and electric vehicles). 
The LTMS considers three strategic options to
mitigation. Two combine a specific suite of tech-
nologies: ‘Start Now’ is driven by energy efficiency,
and also enables a significant shift in the fuel mix for
electricity supply (27 percent each of renewables
and nuclear). ‘Scale Up’ sets a renewables target at
50 percent, and includes nuclear. The third option
models a price on greenhouse gas emissions, and
results in mitigation which roughly follows the
Required by Science (RBS) trajectory until 2035,
when growing emissions from the direct use of coal
in industry and petroleum products in transport out-
weigh the reductions from the greenhouse gas
price. The greenhouse gas pricing option (titled
‘Use the Market’), assumes an escalating green-
house gas price, from R100t/CO2e now to
R750t/CO2e in 2050. The final option comprises a
set of unknown technologies, and is identified as
‘Reach for the goal’, enabling the country to follow
the RBS trajectory. 
It has been assumed that the first two scenarios
make use of regulatory policy mechanisms, in con-
trast to ‘Use the market’ which makes use of an eco-
nomic instrument. Whilst the economic instrument
appears from the high level LTMS analysis to facili-
tate the greatest volume of greenhouse gas emis-
sions mitigation over the timeframe, the study did
not explore what type (or types) of economic instru-
ment would be most appropriate or feasible. The
various strategic options are also mutually exclusive
in their design (although the mitigation technologies
employed overlap), and all are considered to begin
in year 0 and run the full timeframe until 2050. The
options only diverge significantly in mitigation per-
formance from around year four, indicating some
flexibility in the design of policy instruments to
enable the required mitigation. 
3.2 Economic, institutional and political
considerations
South Africa’s economic drivers and mitigation pro-
file are inextricably linked. The country’s electricity
price has historically been one of the cheapest in
the world, resulting in a culture of energy abun-
dance and low attention to energy efficiency. The
economy has therefore developed an historical
competitive advantage around cheap electricity, led
by Eskom, the national utility which effectively gen-
erates and transmits the entire country’s electricity
supply, and a large portion of that of the Southern
African sub-continent. In January 2007 this nirvana
came to an abrupt halt as Eskom ran out of power
as a result of underinvestment in generation capac-
ity. The country now faces a critical shortage of
electricity supply which is anticipated to continue
until at least 2013. In the aftermath of this crisis,
there has been a sudden focus on energy security,
conservation and efficiency. 
Following international best practice, govern-
ment embarked on a programme of privatisation of
the electricity sector in the late 1990s and early
years of this century. This programme has been
almost entirely ineffective and has now been side-
lined by the electricity crisis. However, elements of
it have been retained; most significantly for the pur-
poses of this paper, the requirement that 30 percent
of generation must come from independent power
producers, although Eskom remains the sole pur-
chaser of electricity. 
A number of interventions are being pursued in
the electricity sector as a result of the crisis, under
the heading of the Power Conservation Programme
(PCP) which Eskom has been tasked to develop.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore
the PCP in detail, developments in this area are crit-
ical to the consideration of policy instruments for
greenhouse gas mitigation, given that Eskom repre-
sents over half of South Africa’s emissions. Also,
many of the negative cost mitigation options identi-
fied under the LTMS are in the area of electricity
generation (renewable and nuclear) conservation,
efficiency and reduction of future demand (e.g.
solar water heaters). From a political perspective,
the urgency of the crisis response presents a unique
opportunity to align mitigation objectives with those
of security of energy supply, and ride on the atten-
tion this significant area is currently receiving. In
this, there is also a threat that the response will
favour short-term remedies, which are typically less
costly and more emissions intensive.
The PCP is aimed at achieving a 10 percent
reduction in electricity demand, whilst maintaining
the 4% economic growth objectives contained in
government’s Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative
for South Africa. The PCP comprises a number of
initiatives, one of the cornerstones being the Energy
Conservation Scheme which requires mandatory
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electricity reductions through a quota system. It is
being proposed that this quota scheme is supported
by a trading aspect, the Right to Consume scheme
(Eskom, 2008).
Additional policy developments in the electricity
sector include the Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff
which will subsidise renewable energy power gener-
ators (this initiative is being implemented by the
National Energy Regulator). A green certificate
trading scheme is being developed by the
Department of Minerals and Energy, aimed at fur-
ther assisting renewable energy generators. The
Treasury has proposed a tax on fossil fuel-generat-
ed electricity of 2c/KWh in the finance minister’s
2008 Budget Speech, although this has subse-
quently been put on hold and may be aligned with
additional greenhouse gas emissions taxation. In
the 2009 Budget, the Minister has indicated tax
relief for energy efficiency investments, an increase
in the fuel tax, increased taxation on high-emission
imported vehicles, and a tax on energy-inefficient
lighting, all of which have greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion components. 
The current political priorities of the country are
focused strongly on the dual objectives of employ-
ment creation and poverty alleviation. Exploiting
synergies between greenhouse gas mitigation and
these broader policy considerations may provide
important leverage for the earlier inclusion of miti-
gation policy than might otherwise occur, as eco-
nomic growth also remains a priority, and the gov-
ernment has to work within its (tightening) budget-
ary and capacity constraints.
In the light of the international credit crisis and
objectives of employment creation and poverty alle-
viation, South Africa has announced substantial
infrastructure investment programmes. As many of
these programmes will determine the country’s
greenhouse gas profile for decades to come, con-
sideration of these programmes and expenditure in
the light of the LTMS trajectory and pace and
emphasis of greenhouse gas mitigation policy is cru-
cial.
South Africa is classified as a developing coun-
try in the Kyoto Protocol, yet is also identified as
one of a set of rapidly industrialising countries
(along with China, India and Brazil) which are
being earmarked for some form of commitment to
emissions reduction in the medium term. Until such
a time where there is an internationally enforced
price for greenhouse gas emissions, South Africa
will have to balance the competitiveness implica-
tions of domestic greenhouse gas mitigation policies
with its own commitment to a mitigation trajectory
(Johansson, 2005), and creation of competitive
advantages in an emissions-constrained future glob-
al economy. 
3.3 Greenhouse gas mitigation policy in
South Africa
The focus of this paper is consideration in greater
detail whether ET is appropriate for South African
conditions, and how it could be designed to
account for particular characteristics of the econo-
my. From the analysis of ET considerations and les-
sons in section two, and against the backdrop of
South Africa’s emissions profile and political, eco-
nomic and institutional environment, a number of
these lessons stand out as being of particular rele-
vance for the country. 
3.3.1 Capacity to implement an ETS
ETS are experienced as requiring a high level of
data on behalf of the regulator, extensive planning
and design, and active and responsive maintenance
and ongoing development. South Africa is a devel-
oping country, and experiencing a skills constraint,
particularly in the public sector. The country does
not have experience of greenhouse gas mitigation,
nor extensive experience of market mechanisms,
particularly in the electricity sector. 
The greater the uncertainty and lack of informa-
tion, the more complex an ETS is likely to be in its
design, in order to ensure against the abuse of mar-
ket power and negative distributional conse-
quences. Complexity requires capacity to imple-
ment. 
That ET is a sophisticated economic instrument,
not uniformly well understood, and suffering from
negative perceptions relating to potential polluter
gains, building confidence in the scheme from the
start will be an important objective. Administrative
and capacity needs should be carefully and critical-
ly assessed, and provision made for the strategic
creation of these within an appropriate institution.
That South Africa’s energy sector has greater
characteristics of central planning than liberalisation
may suggest that the use of a market mechanism to
mitigate greenhouse gases will be challenging.
However, theory also suggests that should the
underlying sector be moving towards a market-ori-
ented approach, a market mechanism could facili-
tate this (Fisher et al., 2006).
3.3.2 Emissions coverage – energy focus
An ET can encompass all six Kyoto gases, or a sub-
set of these. Given the comments on capacity
above, and the limited and specific incidence of
non-CO2 gases in South Africa’s emissions profile,
targeting of CO2 only may be appropriate. This will
limit the requirements for understanding mitigation
options to energy and direct CO2 emissions, and
will reduce the potential for market price distortions
from cheap mitigation options from the remaining
gases.
This focus could possibly be further refined to
justify the energy component of CO2 emissions.
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This approach would again reduce complexity,
whilst still addressing 80 percent of South Africa’s
greenhouse gas profile. It is aligned to the current
attention the energy sector is receiving as a result of
the energy crisis, and captures many of the negative
cost mitigation options modelled in the LTMS,
increasing the likelihood that the financial burden of
the scheme would begin modestly
This line of argument leads to the integration of
an ETS with policies being pursued under the PCP.
This is further addressed in the paper on White
Certificates in this series, but the RTC scheme may
provide an existing vehicle which could be expand-
ed to include additional, non-energy efficiency
sources of greenhouse gas mitigation in the future.
Lessons from the New South Wales scheme which
contains both direct and indirect energy emissions
should be explored further in this regard.
A downside of the focus of an ETS on the ener-
gy sector and the CO2 only approach is that certain
key and long-term investments, particularly in infra-
structure which will determine the country’s medi-
um-to-long-term carbon profile (e.g. power genera-
tion, transport infrastructure, new build coal-to-liq-
uids plants) may not receive the required incentive
necessary to ensure the greenhouse gas implica-
tions of this investment are taken into account,
given the timing of these investments and an antic-
ipated low credit price in the early years of the
scheme. Additional policy measures such as subsi-
dies may be required to support this.
In order to contain the competitiveness impact
of an energy sector ETS for energy-intensive
export-oriented industry, mechanisms such as tariffs
on imports or tax rebates at the point of export
could be considered. Alternatively, favourable allo-
cation methods may be used to protect certain sec-
tors, or some sectors might be included through
intensity targets.
The regulation of the transport sector presents a
significant challenge from an institutional perspec-
tive. Nowhere has an ETS been applied to this sec-
tor, and great consideration would need to be given
to the incorporation of this sector into an ETS.
3.3.3 Point of regulation
Power concentrations in both the emissions and
product markets are both theoretically and practi-
cally highlighted as sources of scheme underperfor-
mance and failure. Almost three quarters of South
Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions is from two com-
panies, Sasol and the electricity utility, Eskom. This
is critical when considering where the point of regu-
lation occurs in a proposed ETS. Regulation of
downstream emissions (i.e. at the point of combus-
tion of fossil fuels) may not prove appropriate from
this perspective, even if allocations are made at an
installation level. Under such a design, price con-
trols may be required to prevent the full cost of the
scheme being passed directly to the consumer, with
potentially negative distributional and competitive-
ness consequences. 
Other options include regulation of upstream
fuel providers (coal, oil and natural gas). Again, the
limited number of these entities and the structure of
the energy sector and markets may render this
approach similarly inappropriate. 
In order to achieve the required liquidity and
avoid market concentration issues, a combination
of a ‘product’ (electricity) and direct emissions
(excluding power generation) might provide the
optimum mix. This points again to the interaction
between such a scheme and the proposed RTC
scheme under the PCP.
3.3.4 Timing: Importance of long lead times 
Experience shows that long lead times to allow for
adequate preparation and scheme design, as well
as to send strong signals to emitters to plan for com-
pliance and particularly investment in mitigation
activities are important to prevent disruptive and
confidence damaging retrospective adjustments,
and to facilitate least cost compliance. Consultation
with participants is also important, and long lead
times allows for both a greater understanding of
possible mitigation activities and decision making
processes of emitters, as well as the collection of
data necessary for accurate target setting. 
Particularly given the developments underway
targeting energy conservation and efficiency in the
electricity sector, a considered and lengthy planning
of either an extension to an existing mechanism
such as the RTC scheme or the establishment of an
ETS will strengthen the scheme’s chances of per-
forming well. 
A voluntary pilot may be used to precede an
ETS, facilitating price discovery and enabling learn-
ing about the operation of an ETS domestically.
3.3.5 Data and mitigation costs
There is very little existing data on the costs of mit-
igation, and indeed on certain emissions levels
within the South African inventory. Information,
and particularly symmetry of data on behalf of both
the regulator and emitters has emerged as being
very important to ensure that appropriate targets
are met, that costs do not unduly inhibit growth,
and that windfall profits for certain participants are
avoided. 
In South Africa, it is not clear that sufficient data
and information exists on the costs of mitigation. A
certain level of information has been agreed under
the LTMS, but this is relatively high level and aggre-
gated. Work is underway to understand sectoral
mitigation opportunities and costs in greater detail
(see the forthcoming FRIDGE ‘Study to provide an
overview of the use of economic instruments and to
develop sectoral plans to mitigate the effects of cli-
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mate change)’. It would appear therefore that there
is a concern around data and mitigation costs, and
that this aligns well with the point above on lead
times. Longer lead times would allow time for bet-
ter understanding of emissions mitigation opportu-
nities and costs (Fisher et al., 1996).
3.3.6 Allocation method
Experience and theory indicate that free allocation
on a grandfathering or benchmarking basis is likely
to be a necessary starting point for allocations in an
ETS. However, it is important to move to an auc-
tioning basis as soon as possible. This might be
aligned to the transition between a voluntary pilot
and mandatory phase of an ETS. 
3.3.7 Importance of certainty
Policy uncertainty and change emerges from theo-
retical and practical experience as being particular-
ly damaging for an ETS scheme. At the time of writ-
ing, both the international and the domestic mitiga-
tion policy environments are particularly unclear.
Internationally, the Conference of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen at the end of 2009
is widely expected to provide some clearer indica-
tion of post-2012 international climate change pol-
icy frameworks. Locally, there are numerous policy
initiatives under development which are in some
way related to climate change mitigation, particu-
larly in the energy sector. The Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism is leading an ini-
tiative to develop a more co-ordinated and consol-
idated approach to climate change mitigation, with
a National Climate Change Summit that was
planned for March 2009 to further this objective. 
Particularly in the electricity market, many dis-
tortions currently exist, particularly with regard to
the sudden and steep tariff increases. The more dis-
tortions, the less efficient a greenhouse gas market
policy mechanism will be, and the more complex its
design. 
From a timing perspective, the advantages of
waiting before implementing climate change mitiga-
tion policy, and particularly that of a market mech-
anism, far outweigh a hurried approach which
might result in an inappropriately designed and
consulted scheme. This is particularly so because
many of the negative cost mitigation options are
being considered under the electricity crisis
response.
Certainty is important from another perspective,
that of certainty of prices within a proposed ETS.
Whilst a market mechanism does not provide this
by the nature of the way in which it works, there are
ways of incorporating an element of certainty, such
as through price floors and ceilings. Without these,
the market is not guaranteed to send the right
investment signals in the short term. It may then be
advantageous to include some price certainty espe-
cially in the early years of the scheme. Getting this
price right is critical, and will require information
and research. 
4. Conclusion and future work 
The application of theoretical and practical lessons
from ETS to the South African situation result in a
number of recommendations on the feasibility and
design of a domestic greenhouse gas ETS for the
country:
• Any ETS would benefit from a long planning
and consultative lead time in order to generate
data on which to base targets and allocations; to
communicate targets to emitters and give them
time to plan investment activities; and to allow
for international and domestic policy stability.
This coincides with both the LTMS trajectory
(peaking in 2020 / 25) and the immediate focus
on energy security, efficiency and conservation.
• There are strong reasons for considering aligning
a future ETS to current policy initiatives in the
electricity sector. Particularly interesting in this
regard is the development of the RTC trading
scheme under the PCP.
• The transport sector presents a significant chal-
lenge from an ETS perspective. It is recom-
mended that, due to capacity constraints, this
sector may be considered for incorporation in a
second phase, or addressed through alternative
mitigation policy instruments.
• As certain long term infrastructure and invest-
ment decisions critical to South Africa’s ability to
meet its long term LTMS target, will and are
being made in the short term, these need to be
addressed either through communication of the
intention of allocating targets under an ETS in
the future, or by some alternative policy mecha-
nism.
This paper is an initial study of ET, and its applica-
tion to South Africa as a domestic emissions mitiga-
tion policy instrument. Whilst broad findings
emerge from the guidance of theory and lessons
from existing ETS implemented internationally,
more research is required to confirm these findings
and to explore them and others more comprehen-
sively. The following have been identified as future
research areas:
• The design of an ETS incorporating both direct
and indirect electricity generation emissions,
with particular reference to the New South
Wales scheme (GGAS).
• How a domestic South African ETS might link in
with international trading schemes, and what
the implications of this are for scheme design.
• A detailed exploration of how a domestic trad-
ing scheme might be supported by other mitiga-
tion policy instruments.
• Consideration of the size of emissions sources
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which would be regulated under the scheme:
what represents an efficient threshold in the
South African context?
• Study of how a white certificate trading scheme
such as the proposed RTC scheme might be
expanded to include additional sources of emis-
sions, both energy related and other.
• A field trip based study to understand the
process of design of some of the existing ETS in
existence internationally, and to identify what
techniques have been used to analyse or model
projected price realisation and volatility, implica-
tions of the inclusion of various emissions
sources and sectors, and other design elements.
• Undertake a comparative analysis between tax
and ETS as economic instruments for achieving
a greenhouse gas price in South Africa.
Note
1. The GHG Protocol defines emissions as follows:
Direct emissions (Scope 1) are those emissions from
sources owned or controlled by an organisation e.g.
emissions from a power plant, business travel in a
company car. Indirect emissions are those occurring
from sources owned or controlled by another organi-
sation but resulting from your activity. Purchased
electricity, steam or heat falls under Scope 2, all other
indirect emissions e.g. business travel, production,
outsourced activities e.g. printing and courier services
fall under Scope 3. (www.ghgprotocol.org accessed
10 February 2009)
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